Radioactive Waste and Russia\u27s Northern Fleet: Sinking the Principles of International Environmental Law by Mellor, Justin
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 28 
Number 1 Winter Article 5 
May 2020 
Radioactive Waste and Russia's Northern Fleet: Sinking the 
Principles of International Environmental Law 
Justin Mellor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
Justin Mellor, Radioactive Waste and Russia's Northern Fleet: Sinking the Principles of International 
Environmental Law, 28 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 51 (1999). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For 
more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND RUSSIA'S




Communication with the Russian military on the Kola Peninsula is
poor. We can understand their situation, but the problems of nuclear
waste there are so great that they have to be solved. A catastrophe in
the North would affect the whole of Europe.
Jorgen Kosmo, Norwegian Defense Minister1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1959 the first Soviet nuclear submarine, the Leninski Komsomol
(K-3), entered into service and since that time the former Soviet Union
(FSU) has launched a total of 248 nuclear powered submarines.2 The
majority of these vessels have served with Russia's Northern Fleet,
based in Murmansk in the Barents Sea region.3 At the height of the
Cold War the Barents region was home to the highest concentration of
nuclear weapons and nuclear powered submarines in the world, due, in
part, to the fact that the region contained the only ice free ports on the
Russian Arctic.4
The Soviets, like their NATO counterparts, began their nuclear
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1. Michael Bond, Arctic Standoff, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 4, 1997, at 22.
2. Joshua Handler, The Lasting Legacy: Nuclear Submarine Disposal, JANE'S NAVY
IN'L 11, Jan. 1, 1998, at 15 (in NATO nomenclature the K-3 was referred to as Novem-
ber class).
3. In the early 1990s, 84 of the former Soviet Union's submarines were serving with
the Northern Fleet. See A. BAKLANOV ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, RADIOACTIVE SOURCES IN THE KOLA REGION: ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL
RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR MAN 36 (1996).
4. Gennady P. Luzin et al., The Kola Peninsula: Geography, History and Resources,
ARCTIC, Mar., 1994, at 1.
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building program with little thought to how the nuclear vessels would
be decommissioned without creating serious environmental damage.5
As these submarines have reached the end of their natural service lives,
they have become environmental hazards.6 The spent fuel from the
submarines, and the reactor compartments themselves, pose serious
health and environmental risks.7 Since the end of the cold war, a com-
bination of factors, including financial restraint, maintenance problems
and arms control, have accelerated the rate of decommissioning,
thereby aggravating the problem! At present, the Northern Fleet's in-
terim storage facilities are exhausted and much of the waste is being
stored in an unsafe manner.9 Though immediate damage from Russian
activities may not be obvious, exposure to even low levels of radiation
may have grave consequences for the health and well being of people in
neighboring states.'0
International, regional and bilateral initiatives have been created
in response to the nuclear waste problems generated by the Russian
Navy." Many of these have provided funds for studies and initial aid
towards solving the problems of waste disposal. 2 The Rovanniemi Dec-
5. Alexi Yablokov the head of the Center for Russian Environmental Policy in Mos-
cow indicated that despite the centralized economy of the Soviet Union, "when they pro-
duced nuclear submarines,.. nobody thought about how to decommission them." See
David Hoffman, Russia Suffering Fallout Over Nuclear Submarines: Disposal Problems
Causing Worries Worldwide, DALLAS MORNING STAR, Nov. 27, 1998, at 55A
6. Handler, supra note 2, at 17-18. Environmental hazards include: leakage of fuel,
inappropriate storage of fuel when decommissioning the submarines, reactor accidents,
and sinkings of submarines.
7. Geoffrey York, Russia's 'Floating Chernobyls" Part of Deadly Nuclear Mix: Disas-
ter in the Making, GLOBE AND MAIL, Jan. 2, 1996, at Al.
8. Handler, supra note 2, at 16-18.
9. H.-J. ENGELMANN, ET AL., INVENTORY OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SPENT FUEL AT
THE KOLA PENINSULA REGION OF NORTH-WEST RUSSIA 115 (1996) [hereinafter
INVENTORY].
10. Apart from long latency periods for certain kinds of cancer, it has also been sug-
gested that exposure to radiation may produce cumulative genetic damage with mutated
genes being passed on from one generation to the next. See Herman Muller, Radiation
and Heredity, 54 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 42, 44 (1964). Russia's neighbors should be con-
cerned given the example of the Isle of Man where low level exposure from the UK's Sel-
lafield nuclear reprocessing plant has been linked to increases in childhood cancer in Ire-
land and the Isle of Man. See Terry Hall, '....Carried by the Wind Out to Sea" Ireland
and the Isle of Man v. Sellafield: Anatomy of a Transboundary Pollution Dispute, 6 GEO.
INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 639, 649-53 (1994).
11. See Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment, in ORAN YOUNG,
CREATING REGIMES: ARCTIC ACCORDS AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 200 (1998) [here-
inafter Kirkenes Declaration]; Declaration on Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Re-
gion, in id. at 217.
12. The problem has been studied extensively. For example: IAEA funded Interna-
tional Arctic Seas Assessment Project (1993), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Pro-
gram, International Science and Technology Centre established by Japan, EU, U.S., Arc-
tic Nuclear Waste Program (ANWAP), Euro-Arctic Barents-Region, and NATO. For a
more detailed description of studies and initiatives, see BAKLANOV ET AL., supra note 3,
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laration on the Protection of the Environment13 , signed by the eight Arc-
tic nations,4 cited the importance of international co-operation and fi-
nancial support in the "rehabilitation of areas that have been polluted
as a result of the operation of nuclear facilities." 5 Similarly, the Bar-
ents Euro-Arctic Council in the Kirkenes Declaration recognized it as a
serious problem that requires international co-operation."6 Despite this
push towards international co-operation and aid for dealing with its
spent fuel problem, the Russian Navy has continued to operate nuclear
powered submarines and is presently engaged in building and launch-
ing new vessels that rely on nuclear propulsion. 7
This paper argues that the international community is undermin-
ing principles of international environmental law, such as state respon-
sibility and co-operation. Russia has not been admonished for its viola-
tion of existing treaty law, such as the London Convention, 8 and has
instead become the beneficiary of international aid. 19 By reconstructing
the problem as regional, Russia has avoided the issue of state responsi-
bility. It has further ignored the precautionary approach and has
launched new submarines as well as proposing the creation of floating
nuclear plants for the Arctic communities based on naval reactor de-
signs.2° Regional co-operation has become nothing more than a military
subsidy in that it allows the Russian Navy to avoid diverting portions of
its operational budget into nuclear waste disposal and treatment.
Before analyzing this problem from the principles of state responsi-
bility and co-operation, it is first necessary to outline the scope and
magnitude of the nuclear waste problem.
at 15-21.
13. Kirkenes Declaration, supra note 11, at 200.
14. The eight Arctic nations are Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Canada, and the United States of America. See
Kirkenes Declaration, supra note 11, at 200.
15. Id.
16. Declaration on Cooperation in the Barents Region, reprinted in YOUNG, supra
note 11, at 217.
17. The SSBM Yuri Dolgoruky, the lead boat of the new Borey class, is under con-
struction at Severodvinsk. See Alison Clayton & Ian Kemp, Russian Navy Readiness
Remains Despite Cuts, JANE'S DEFENCE WKLY, Sept. 9, 1998, at 8.
18 Intergovernmental Conference on the Convention on the Dumping of Wastes at
Sea: Final Documents, Nov. 13, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1291 (as amended in 1996, the chief in-
ternational convention for the control of deliberate disposal of substances at sea). The
1996 Protocol takes an even greater precautionary approach to dumping by creating a
reverse listing. Article 4(1)(c) "prohibits the dumping of any wastes" other than those
listed in annex 1. Id. at art. 4(1)(c).
19. Id. at art. VIII, X
20. Russia Nuclear Power Plant in Works, GLOBE AND MAIL, Sept. 11, 1997, at A17.
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II. DEFINING THE NORTHERN FLEET'S WASTE PROBLEM
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
engaged in an extensive submarine building program, culminating in
the construction of 248 submarines.2' Over the years, the FSU has suf-
fered fifty-two known accidents involving nuclear submarines or ves-
sels.2 Before 1992, the navy often dumped spent fuel and reactor com-
partments, along with low level waste, into the Barents Sea.23 In the
area surrounding Novaya Zemlia, the navy has dumped two subma-
rines, one with two loaded reactors, the other with a reactor containing
spent fuel.' In total, thirteen submarine reactors were disposed of in
the area; 5 six of them containing varying amounts of spent fuel."
Dumping was typically carried out when a submarine was damaged or
when its fuel could not be extracted safely and put into interim storage
to await reprocessing.27 This occurred despite domestic and interna-
tional prohibitions against dumping.'
Due to a combination of fiscal restraint and the START agree-
ments, the rate of decommissioning has rapidly accelerated. 29 By 1998
the FSU had retired approximately 167 submarines and was averaging
about twenty submarines per year.0 In the Northern Fleet alone, there
are presently 132 inoperative reactors in decommissioned vessels,31
many of which have fuel assemblies remaining in the reactors because
2of the critical shortage of storage space.
The FSU procedure for dealing with spent fuel involves off loading
the fuel onto service ships, which then transport it to fuel depots for
temporary storage. After cooling, the spent fuel is transported by rail to
the Mayak reprocessing plant in the Urals.' The contaminated reactor
21. Handler, supra note 2, at 15.
22. BAKLANOV ET AL., supra note 3, at 44.
23. Id.
24. Jason H. Eaton, Kicking the Habit: Russia's Addiction to Nuclear Waste Dumping
at Sea, 23 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 287, 293 (1995).
25. Handler, supra note 2, at 16.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. International concern provoked numerous reports of radioactive waste dumping.
Id.
29. Id. at 16. The two START agreements are: Treaty on the Reduction and Limita-
tion of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, U.S.-U.S.S.R., reprinted in JOZEF
GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL: A GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS 591 (1994)
[hereinafter START I]; Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offen-
sive Arms, Jan. 3, 1993, U.S.-U.S.S.R., reprinted in id. at 697 [hereinafter START II].
30. Handler, supra note 2, at 15.
31. Id. at 16.
32. INVENTORY, supra note 9, at 90.
33. Handler, supra note 2, at 16.
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compartments are then sealed up and stored afloat.' Due largely to fis-
cal problems, the FSU has not been able to afford the cost of transporta-
tion and reprocessing. 5 Consequently, approximately 49,000 spent fuel
assemblies are now sitting in interim storage,31 some being stored im-
properly at outdoor sites.
It is difficult to assess the extent of the environmental damage from
the FSU submarine program. It is generally believed that there is wide
spread "low level contamination" throughout the entire fleet support fa-
cility.3 Some recent reports have found an eight-fold increase in radio-
activity in the sediment found around the Kola bases in the last three
years.3 9 The amount of Cobalt 60 found in the vicinity of the naval base
at Poljarny has increased from 10(bq/kg) to 80 (bq/kg).4° Scientists from
the Russian Academy of Science's Marine Biology Institute discovered
that levels of Caesium 137 in Andreeva Bay near Norway had also in-
creased.4' These increases are likely due to deteriorating storage facili-
ties."2 A recent European Commission report concluded, "the storage
situation constitutes a major hazard to the population of the area and
the environment."
4 3
However, a 1996 review of studies carried out on radioactive nu-
clides in the region concluded that most of the marine pollution was
composed of Caesium 137 and Strontium 90, both of which could be
traced directly to the Chernobyl accident and nuclear atmospheric tests
carried out in the Soviet north." This finding lends support to an early
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) study that found fine grain
ocean sediment actually traps radioactivity and limits environmental
damage. 45 This has led some to suggest that the dumping option may be
34. Id. at 16. It is important to differentiate between the high level waste (the spent
fuel) and the low level radioactive waste (reactor compartments). For a description of
what is involved in decommissioning a nuclear submarine. See Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries House of Representatives on Oversight of the Ocean dumping Act
and National Ocean Pollution Planning Act and the Disposal of Defueled, Decommis-
sioned Nuclear Submarines, 97' Cong. 16-17 (1982) (statement of Carl Schmidt, U.S. Na-
val Nuclear Propulsion Program Director).
35. Handler, supra note 2, at 16.
36. INVENTORY, supra note 9, at 92.
37. York, supra note 7, at Al.
38. Handler, supra note 2, at 18. The storing of waste outside creates the risk that
the containers will develop cracks as a result of thawing and freezing. See Thomas Nil-
sen, Nuclear Waste Storage in Andreeva Bay (visited Oct. 9, 1999) <http://
www.Belona.no/e/fakta/fakta87.htm>.
39. Rob Edwards, Hot Waters, NEW SCIENTIST, May 9, 1998, at 11.
40. Id. (According to Bellona these high levels of Cobalt are indications that storage
of submarine reactors holding liquid waste in the vicinity are corroding.)
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. INVENTORY, supra note 9, at 119.
44. BAKLANOV ETAL., supra note 3, at 100.
45. David Schneider, Not In My Backyard: Could Ocean Mud Trap Nuclear Waste
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a safe environmental solution to Russia's problem."
The immediate absence of extensive radioactive marine contamina-
tion does not mean that a problem does not exist. Almost all of the
dumped naval reactors were filled with a special hardening solution to
prevent salt-water deterioration, which means it may be some time be-
fore the effects of the contamination begin to appear in the environ-
ment." The potential for an accident also increases as more submarines
await decommissioning or are scrapped." The shortage of interim stor-
age facilities poses grave hazards and there have already been reports
of leakages and accidents.4 9 Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister
Nikolay Yegorov has stated that "matters worsen every year... and
could turn into a catastrophe worse than Chernobyl."' Government
statements such as this are of obvious concern to Russia's northern
neighbors.
The lack of Russian government funding resulted in only two sub-
marines being scrapped in 1997 for both the Pacific and Northern
Fleets. 5' In addition, at the current rate of fuel shipment, it will take
thirty to forty years to reprocess all of the spent fuel." In spite of these
facts, the Russian Navy has continued operations and a nuclear build-
ing program. In 1996 the Navy launched the much delayed nuclear
powered cruiser, Peter the Great, with an estimated operating cost of
U.S. $50-100 million per year,' as well as laying the keel of the nuclear
submarine Yuri Dolgoruki.' The Russian Navy announced in 1998 that
it hoped to launch two nuclear submarines in 1999' and Admiral Oleg
Yerofeyev indicated that Russia's building program will now focus on
higher technology boats because it makes "sense to have fewer vessels
but of a higher quality."" The Russian Navy demonstrated its opera-
from Old Russian Subs, SCIENTIFIc AMERICAN, Mar. 1997 at 20, 21.
46. The IAEA has studied plutonium that was dispersed by a downed B-52 bomber of
the coast of Greenland. Charles D. Hollister of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute
has been vocal in supporting a study of the dumping option for subs. Id. at 22.
47. Eaton notes that witness accounts indicate that the navy often fired at nuclear
waste containers to quicken their sinking. Eaton, supra note 24, at 293.
48. In December 1995 the Northern Fleet failed to pay its electricity bill and had its
power cut resulting in a failure of the cooling system and overheating of one reactor. See
York, supra note 7, at A12.
49. BAKLANOV ET AL., supra note 3, at 188. One defueled reactor compartment was
lost at sea in 1995 whilst being towed from Severodvinsk to Murmansk for storage.
Handler, supra note 2, at 17.
50. Al Venter, Russian Nuclear Neglect May Cause Next Chernobyl, JANE'S DEFENCE
WKLY., Apr. 7, 1999, at 8.
51. Handler, supra note 2, at 19.
52. Id.
53. Russia Arms for Oblivion, ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 1996, at 47.
54. Id.
55. Clayton & Kemp, supra note 17, at 8.
56. Id.
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tional capability in December 1997 when the Russians tested ballistic
missiles from submarines in the Barents Sea.7 All of this information
supports the conclusion that severely limited Russian Navy funds have
been directed towards operations and building as opposed to dealing
with the waste problem.
Though construction of new boats has fallen behind schedule" and
operations for the Northern Fleet have declined as a result of recent
troubles in the Russian economy,59 analysts still believe that submarine
and anti-submarine warfare will continue to have the "highest priority"
in terms of Russia's defense expenditures.' Recent government docu-
ments indicate that Russia is still planning to allocate three and-a-half
percent GDP for defense appropriations in the 1998-2025 period.6' Rus-
sia has sought extensive foreign co-operation in dealing with its nuclear
problems. 2  As early as 1992, it began seeking aid from the United
States; but despite its pleas for assistance in dealing with nuclear
waste, Russia has still commissioned several nuclear vessels in ensuing
years.6 Much of the Russian interest in Arctic co-operation has been in
attempt to obtain environmental aid to deal with self-inflicted prob-
lems.64 As part of a recent Russian-Norwegian bilateral agreement, the
Norwegian government has agreed to provide assistance to clean up the
Andreeva Bay sight, build rail cars for shipping waste and begin a pilot
project to deal with a contaminated submarine tender named the
Lepse.6 The Norwegian parliament has been adamant that it will not
provide financial assistance if the money can be used to support the op-
erations of the Russian Navy.6 However, simply by paying for a portion
of the clean up, the Norwegians are relieving the Russians of the need
to divert resources from their naval operations budget into waste man-
agement. In that sense, co-operation and aid serve as indirect military
subsidies.
The increase in international co-operation has not changed Russian
57. Cold Wars in Cold Waters, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 23 1998, at 19.
58. Clayton & Kemp, supra note 17, at 8.
59. Id.
60. Norman Polmar, The Soviet Navy, PROCEEDINGS, Feb. 1998, at 88.
61. See Richard F. Staar, Russia's New Blueprint For National Security, 26
STRATEGIC REV., 31, 34 (1998).
62. Japan Asks U.S., Russia, LAEA for Help in Nuke Accident, MALAY. GEN. NEWS,
Oct. 1, 1999, at Al; Democracy and Investment New Focus of EU Assistance to Russia,
Ukraine and Other Newly Independent States, RAPID, Dec. 22, 1998, at 1.
63. Gabriel Schonfeld, Underwatergate, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 27, 1992, at 20.
64. YOUNG, supra note 11, at 66.
65. Igor Kudrick, Russian-Norwegian Commission on Radwaste Holds First Meeting
in Moscow, (July 31, 1998) (visited Nov. 8, 1998) <http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/
nfl/news/98073>.
66. Thomas Nilsen, Nuclear Waste Cleanup to Start in Russian Arctic, (Jun. 2, 1998)
(visited Nov. 3, 1998) <http'//www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/news/980731>.
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behavior or policy on contamination in the Barents.67 The Northern
Fleet continues to generate 5000 tons of solid radioactive waste each
year despite the absence of a comprehensive plan to deal with it.6 In
October 1997, the Russian government announced that it planned to
build a series of floating nuclear power plants, based on naval reactor
designs, to supply Siberian towns with electricity.69 This plan would re-
quire the barges to be towed to Murmansk for servicing and refuelling."
The Norwegian Defense Minister, Jorgen Kosmo, condemned the initia-
tive, stating, "[t]his is not the kind of progress I am hoping for from
Russia.... They should use their first class engineers to make existing
power plants more secure, rather than try to realise a vision of floating
plants.""
As well as creating problems in the Barents region with nuclear
waste, Russia has also been complicit in the proliferation of the problem
in the developing world. In the late 1980s, Russia leased a nuclear at-
tack submarine (SSN) to India, as well as providing technicians and as-
sistance, which served as basis for the development of an indigenous
Indian SSN project.72 This occurred in spite of Russia's own problems
with the disposal of waste from the Northern Fleet 73 and is indicative of
the blind nature of Russian policy on the costs and impacts of nuclear
technology.74
Despite Russia's willingness to accept financial aid to deal with the
Barents problem, it has been less than forthcoming with information
about the situation. It has refused Norwegian experts access to the fuel
depot at Andreeva Bay, fifty kilometers from Norway.5 As one senior
official stated, "[nio nation would want this kind of storage facility so
close to its border. We would like to see it for ourselves, and it concerns
us that we cannot."76 The cloak of secrecy extends not only to foreign,
but also to domestic authorities. In 1996, inspectors from Gosatomnad-
zor, the civil radiation protection agency, were barred from inspecting
the site.77
67. Ethirajan Anbarasan, Nuclear Watch in the Far North; Scandinavian Countries
Concerned Over the Concentration of Russian Nuclear Material on the Kola Peninsula,
UNESCO COURIER, Nov. 1, 1998, at 10.
68. INVENTORY, supra note 9, at 92.
69. Norway goes Critical over Floating Reactors, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 4, 1997, at 22.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Rahul Bedi, India Presses Ahead with SSN to Boost Navy's Nuclear Profile,
JANE'S DEFENCE WKLY., July 22, 1998, at 26.
73. INVENTORY, supra note 9.
74. Id.
75. Bond, supra note 1, at 22.
76. Id.
77. Deborah MacKenzie, Russian Secrecy Could Sink Nuclear Aid, NEW SCIENTIST,
Apr. 20, 1996, at 4.
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The Russians have effectively ignored the principle of state respon-
sibility and twisted the concept of co-operation. The Northern Fleet
situation demonstrates the contradictory nature of state responsibility
and co-operation and shows how a country may become the beneficiary
of co-operation without having to accept liability or even modify its haz-
ardous behavior."8 As the following sections will demonstrate, interna-
tional environmental law is inadequate to deal with this type of situa-
tion.
III. ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
In order to examine the effect of Russian policy regarding nuclear
waste, it is necessary to look at both treaty law and customary interna-
tional law in the area of state responsibility.
A. Treaty Law
Part of the difficulty with imposing any liability on the FSU for con-
tamination in the Barents Sea is that the pollution source is military
based, not civilian. Many treaties specifically exclude military pollution
sources.7 9 The 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter" prohibits marine
dumping in Article 4,81 but Article 7 specifically excludes vessels that
are entitled to sovereign immunity under international law.82 Article
10(4) of the 1996 Protocol to the London Convention' also exempts
those vessels with sovereign immunity.' Because military vessels are
subject to such immunity, these articles effectively remove the Barents
78. Id.
79. See Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Final Act, Nov.
1982, 21 ILM 1245 [hereinafter Third United Nations]; Contracting Parties to the Con-
vention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other Matter
(London Convention), 1972: Final Act, 1996 Protocol and Resolutions, 36 ILM 1 [herein-
after London Convention].
80. London Convention, supra note 79.
81. Id. at 9.
82. Id. at 10.
83. Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 and Resolutions Adopted by the Special Meeting (as
adopted by the Special Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the London Convention
1972 on Nov. 7, 1996) LC/SM 1/6, Nov. 14, 1996.
84. Article 10 (4) states:
Application and Enforcement: This protocol shall not apply to those vessels
and aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity under international law. How-
ever, each Contracting Party shall ensure by the adoption of appropriate
measures that such vessels and aircraft owned or operated by it act in a
manner consistent with the object and purpose of this Protocol and shall in-
form the Organization accordingly.
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problem from the reach of the conventions, since most of the threat
stems from submarines awaiting de-fuelling.
Some commentators have suggested that once a submarine is de-
commissioned it loses its sovereign immunity and that a de-fuelled
submarine dumped at sea would be subject to London Convention regu-
lation." This argument is based on the definition of "warship" con-
tained under Article 29 of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conven-
tion,8 which requires the ship to be under the command of an officer."
But this argument leads one to make fine distinctions in order to iden-
tify the point at which decommissioning takes place; something that is
very difficult to do in the Russian case, where much of the submarine
scuttling occurred in an emergency context.m
Even if the London Convention was applicable to waste that was
dumped into the Barents Sea; the convention would still be of little use
in attempting to impose state responsibility. First, the Convention did
not come into effect until 1976 for the Soviet Union, by which point con-
siderable amounts of dumping had already occurred.89 Second, even
under the 1996 Protocol, there are no specifics on responsibility and li-
ability for dumping.' Article 15 simply states that "the Contracting
Parties undertake to develop procedures regarding liability arising from
the dumping or incineration at sea of wastes."9' This means that coun-
tries in the Barents Region have no recourse against the FSU should
the contamination problem increase, as previously dumped waste be-
gins to work its way into the environment and existing storage sites de-
teriorate.
The one convention that could have effectively imposed state re-
sponsibility on the FSU for contamination in the Barents Sea was the
Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships.2 It
applied to both civil and naval vessels 3 and, under Article 2(1), held
that "[tihe operator of a nuclear ship be absolutely liable for any nuclear
damage upon proof that such damage has been caused by a nuclear in-
cident involving the nuclear fuel of, or radioactive products or waste
85. See W. Jackson Davis and Jon M. Van Dyke, Dumping of Decommissioned Nu-
clear Submarines at Sea, 14 MARINE POLY 467, 475 (1990).
86. See Third United Nations, supra note 78, at 1275.
87. Id.
88. For example, in April 1970 the Soviets scuttled a November Class SSN off the
coast of Spain following a loss of stability in pitch caused by a fire on board. See
BAKLANOV ET AL., supra note 3, at 44.
89. See generally London Convention, supra note 79.
90. See id.
91. Id. at art. 15.
92. Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962, 57 AM.
J. IN'L L. 268 (1963), reprinted in PHILLIPPE SANDS, CHERNOBYL: LAW AND
COMMUNICATION 82 (1988).
93. Id. at art. 1(1).
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produced in such a ship."" However, the convention was never signed
by either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. and did not enter into force.95 The fact
that none of the countries with naval programs relying on nuclear pro-
pulsion signed the treaty indicates the ultra-hazardous nature of the ac-
tivity.96
Similarly, Russia is not a party to the recently concluded Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety
of Radioactive Waste Management." Even if it were a party, the
agreement would be of little use in imposing responsibility and liability
on the FSU's government. In the preamble, the Convention reaffirms
"the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the safety of spent fuel and ra-
dioactive waste management rests with the States."" However, Article
3(3) of the Convention explicitly exempts "radioactive waste within mili-
tary or defence programmes" unless the Contracting Party decides to
bring it within the Convention.' In the Russian case, it would be diffi-
cult to evaluate the applicability of the Convention since the decommis-
sioning of nuclear submarines is in the process of being transferred
from the Ministry of Defense to the civil Ministry of Atomic Energy.'6
Even presuming the applicability of the Convention, the agreement
is lacking in substance. There are no provisions within the Convention
to impose liability on a state or civil operator for transboundary pollu-
tion caused by the mishandling of spent fuel.'0 ' The Convention does
not even specify exact standards of storage for spent fuel. Rather, it
simply requires that the contracting parties take appropriate steps to
"ensure that.., individuals, society, and environment are adequately
protected against radiological hazards."'02 It then provides some very
94. Id. at art. 2(1).
95. Id. at 83.
96. Id.
97. Signing of Conventions: Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Manage-
ment and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (visited Oct. 9, 1999) <http:
//www.iaea.org/worldaton/updates/jointa.html>.
98. Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management, Sept. 5, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1436, 1437, preamble (vi) [here-
inafter Spent Fuel Convention].
99. Id. at 1440, art. 3(3). Article 3(3) states:
This Convention shall not apply to the safety of management of spent fuel
or radioactive waste within military or defence programmes, unless declared
as spent fuel or radioactive waste for the purposes of this Convention by the
Contracting Party. However, this Convention shall apply to the safety of
management of spent fuel and radioactive waste from military or defence
programmes if and when such materials are transferred permanently to and
managed within exclusively civilian programmes.
Id.
100. It appears that reallocation of responsibility was made in May 1998. See Clayton
& Kemp, supra note 17, at 8.
101. See generally Spent Fuel Convention, supra note 98.
102. Id. at art. 4.
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general recommendations on storage." The absence of precise rules
and a provision for liability in the case of an accident results in hard
law becoming soft law due to the absence of content.'0 Further, under
Article 36(3),'0' the Convention allows a contracting party to impose a
veil of secrecy around information dealing with military waste that the
party chooses to bring under the auspices of the Convention.'0 This
makes proving the negligence of a contracting party extremely difficult.
Conventions like the Spent Fuel Convention that rely largely on the
domestic law of contracting states to enforce standards of safety and re-
sponsibility are of limited worth. The Russian Navy dumped spent fuel
despite its own regulations and those of other domestic agencies against
it."° The present Russian Constitution contains provisions under Arti-
cle 42 that hold the state liable for domestic ecological damage."' It
states that "[elveryone has the right to a favourable environment, to re-
liable information about its conditions, and to compensation for any loss
caused by ecological damage to his health or property.""° The constitu-
tion also indicates that the general principles and norms of interna-
tional law are an integral part of Russian law if the Russian Federation
is party to an agreement.1 However, this is of little use in attempting
to enforce state responsibility since the Russians have vigorously
avoided conventions that impose liability and most nuclear law is now
based on the concept of "incentives" as opposed to punitive sanctions."'
Western states, in providing assistance to deal with Russia's mili-
tary waste problem, need to tie the aid to specific hard law provisions
concerning state responsibility. One particular model might be the
103. Id.
104. Katia Boustany, The Development of Nuclear Law or the Art of Legal Evasion, 51
NUCLEAR L. BULL. 39, 44 (1998).
105. Spent Fuel Convention, supra note 98, at 1450, art. 36(3). Article 36(3) states:
With respect to information relating to spent fuel or radioactive waste fal-
ling within the scope of this Convention by virtue of paragraph 3 of Article
3, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the exclusive discretion
of the Contracting Party to decide: (i) whether such information is classified
or otherwise controlled to preclude release (ii) whether to provide informa-
tion referred to in sub-paragraph (i) above in the context of the Convention;
and (iii) what conditions of confidentiality are attached to such information
if it is provided in the context of this Convention.
Id.
106. Id.
107. Eaton, supra note 24, at 297.
108. KONST. RF. art. 42, reprinted in S. E. FINER ET. AL., COMPARING CONSTITUTIONS
257 (1995).
109. Id.
110. Id. at art. 15.4.
111. See, e.g., Convention on Nuclear Safety, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1514 reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY: LEGAL
SERIES No. 16, 1 (1994) (This Convention lacks "hard" standards or any liability for
radiological transboundary pollution).
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Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment.1 12 Article 3
gives citizens of contracting parties the right to bring cases before each
other's courts in order to obtain compensation or to question the per-
missibility of an activity.11 3 This would allow individuals in other Bar-
ents countries the right to seek redress within the Russian legal system
for damage done by the nuclear activities of the Northern Fleet.
It may be argued, however, that some treaty law on nuclear mat-
ters works in direct opposition to the concept of state responsibility. For
example, the Russians are party to the Vienna Convention on Early No-
tification of a Nuclear Accident,"' which requires that notification be
given to those states that are affected by a nuclear accident at any "ra-
dioactive waste management facility." The state must also furnish in-
formation on the characteristics of the accident to the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)11 6 and to those "States which are physi-
cally affected." 7 Whilst, on the surface, the early notification appears
to be a positive step, it may be argued that by providing notification of a
nuclear accident involving the Northern Fleet, the Russians may claim
that they have fulfilled their procedural obligations and that their li-
ability is limited. In that case, the Convention shifts the onus and may
result in a victim being accused of not acting to prevent damage and
112. Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, 1092
U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in SANDS, supra note 92, at 144.
113. Id. at 145. Article 3 states:
Any person who is affected or may be affected by a nuisance caused by envi-
ronmentally harmful activities in another Contracting State shall have the
right to bring before the appropriate Court or Administrative Authority of
that State the question of the permissibility of such activities, including the
question of measures to prevent damage, and to appeal against the decision
of the Court or the Administrative Authority to the same extent and on the
same terms as a legal entity of the State in which the activities are being
carried out. The provisions of the first paragraph of this Article shall be
equally applicable in the case of proceedings concerning compensation for
damage caused by environmentally harmful activities. The question of
compensation shall not be judged by rules which are less favorable to the in-
jured party than the rules of compensation of the State in which the activi-
ties are being carried out.
Id.
114. Vienna Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Sept. 26, 1986,
1439 U.N.T.S. 276, 25 I.L.M. 1370 (1986).
115. Id. at art. 1.
116. Id. at art. 2(a). The International Atomic Energy Agency is a specialized agency
within the United Nations system, comprised of 129 Member States. The IAEA serves as
the world's central intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in
the nuclear field, and as the international inspectorate for the application of nuclear
safeguards and verification measures covering civilian nuclear programs. Profile of the
/AEA (visited Oct. 9, 1999) http://www.iaea.org/worldatonAbout/profile.shtml>.
117. Vienna Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, supra note 114,
at art. 2(a).
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therefore being contributorily negligent.""
The recent Norwegian-Russian agreement on waste clean up spe-
cifically insulates the parties involved from any form of liability in case
of an accident during the clean up.' This means that there is abso-
lutely no recourse for liability either against the state, using treaty law,
or on a civil basis against the companies participating in the project.
Treaty law in the areas of spent fuel management and liability for
nuclear accidents are either non-applicable, in the case of the Russian
Navy, or are based on incentive conventions and impose no require-
ments for state responsibility.2 ° Therefore, the Northern Fleet and its
environmental problems are beyond the reach of international treaty
law."' This leaves only customary international law as a means of im-
posing liability should an accident occur."
B. Customary Law
There are many sources of customary international law that could
impose a duty of state responsibility on the Russians for any trans-
boundary pollution that might result from their nuclear activity in the
Barents Sea. 22 In 1961, the United Nations passed Resolution 1629,
which dealt with the issue of nuclear pollution." It stated that "the
fundamental principles of international law impose a responsibility on
all States concerning actions which might have harmful biological con-
sequences for the existing and future generations of peoples of other
states."'2 The most frequently cited source of customary state responsi-
bility is Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration ,126 which holds that
states have a "responsibility to ensure that activities within their juris-
118. This idea of notification limiting liability may also be applied to Ukraine and the
existing situation with Chernobyl. See Justin Mellor, The Negative Effects of Chernobyl
on International Environmental Law: The Creation of The Polluter Gets Paid Principle,
17 WIS. INT'L L. J. 65, 73-74 (1999).
119. Igor Kudrick, Russian-Norwegian Commission on Radwaste holds first meeting
in Moscow, (visited Nov. 8, 1998) <http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nflnews/98073>.
120. Spent Fuel Convention, supra note 98, at art. 3.
121. Id.
122. Customary international law, in contrast to treaty law, is a consequence largely
of uniformities in state behavior rather than formal writings resulting from extensive
deliberation and negotiation. BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER 107 (3 ed. 1997).
123. See G.A. Res. 1629, Nov. 28, 1961, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS,
Series I, Vol. VIII 241 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1974)
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human En-
vironment, The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16,
1972, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14 and Corr. 1, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter
Stockholm Declaration].
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diction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond their national jurisdiction.""7 The Rio Decla-
ration,2 in Principle 2, reaffirms the issue of state responsibility.'" It
also recognizes, under Principle 16, that "the polluter in principle
should bear the cost of pollution.""'0
Besides the Rio Declaration and Stockholm Declaration, there are
also legal precedents such as the Trail Smelter arbitration13 and the
Corfu Channel case," 2 which imply a custom of state responsibility. The
Trail Smelter arbitration established the principle that "no state has the
right to permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause in-
jury... in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons
there in.""= The Corfu Channel case held that every state has an "obli-
gation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to
the rights of other States."3'
However, the weight of these precedents has been undermined in
recent years by the Sandoz chemical fire'3 and the Chernobyl acci-
dent,13 1 in which liability for damage was not imposed on the polluter
states. 137 In fact, it can be argued that Chernobyl has resulted in a "pol-
luter gets paid principle," in which the polluter becomes the recipient of
aid rather than compensating those states that are harmed.'3 By 1995,
127. Id. at princ. 21.
128. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on En-
vironment and Development, Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1 (1992), re-
printed in STANLEY P. JOHNSON, THE EARTH SUMMIT: THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCED), 117-121 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declara-
tion].
129. Id. at 118.
130. Id.
131. See Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.) 1931-1941, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, reprinted
in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN CANADA 1209 (Hugh K.
Kindred et al., eds, 4" ed., 1987).
132. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN CANADA, supra note 131, at 1229.
133. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, at 1212.
134. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 1231.
135. See generally Devereaux F. McClatchey, Chernobyl and Sandoz One Decade
Later: The Evolution of State Responsibility for International Disasters, 1986-1996, 25
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 659, at 661 (1996). On November 1, 1986, a fire broke out in a
chemical warehouse owned and operated by the Sandoz Corporation in Schweizerhale,
near Basel, Switzerland. Id. The fire spread quickly and because of all the water used
water used by the fire departments to combat the fire, between 10,000 to 15,000 cubic
meters of chemically-infested water seeped into the Rhine River through the Sandoz
sewer system. Id.
136. Id. On April 26, 1986, a reactor exploded at a nuclear power plant located in
Chernobyl, U.S.S.R. Id. As a result of the explosion, a devastating amount of radioactive
emissions were released into the atmosphere, spreading quickly throughout the Soviet
Republic and eventually across the entire face of Europe. Id.
137. See Mellor, supra note 118, 65-66 (1999).
138. Id.
1999
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the Ukraine had secured U.S. $2.3 billion from western nations to close
the Chernobyl plant and begin a full cleanup.9 The recent Norwegian-
Russian agreement on dealing with pollution from the Northern Fleet
provides U.S. $60 million for clean up purposes, but fails to attach any
meaningful provisions surrounding state responsibility.40 This serves
only to reinforce the polluter gets paid principle, rather than one of
state responsibility. It can be argued that the indulgences shown by the
West in the Chernobyl affair have been counterproductive in trying to
get the FSU to accept responsibility for its own nuclear contamina-
tion."" As one commentator has suggested, one must wonder "given the
Russian Federation's persistent delay in adopting legislation on nuclear
third party liability and on safety, whether such indulgence has not in
fact been counterproductive."' At the very least, there is no incentive
to change or modify their current behavior. This reluctance to change
was confirmed at the recent conclusion of the Russian-Norwegian
agreement, when the Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov,
clearly indicated that the agreement in no way applies to "those subma-
rines that are patrolling the region, that are on active duty."
A further source of customary law for imposing state responsibility
is found in the ILC's Report of the Working Group of International Li-
ability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by
International Law.'" Article 1(a) indicates that draft articles apply to
activities that are not prohibited by international law but involve the
risk of transboundary harm. 4" This would clearly bring Russia's fuel
storage at Andreeva Bay, fifty kilometers from Norway, within its
scope. Article 3 acknowledges that states do not have unlimited free-
dom to carry on activities within their jurisdiction and that they have "a
general obligation to prevent or minimize the risk of causing trans-
boundary harm."'" The draft articles also make states liable to pay
compensation for activities that create harm. 47 However, Article 16
specifically allows data and information on national security to be with-
held by the state.4 This exemption for national security purposes
139. See Jeff Sallot, G-7 Nations to Finance Chernobyl Closing, GLOBE AND MAIL,
June 19, 1995, at A13.
140. Id.
141. Boustany, supra note 104, at 53.
142. Id.
143. Richard Paddock, Russia Signs Accord With Norway to Dismantle Aging Nuclear
Subs, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 1998, at A4.
144. Report of the Working Group of International Liability for Injurious Conse-
quences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law and Draft Articles from
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session,
U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No.10, at 235-244, U.N. Doc. AI51/10 (1996).
145. Id. at art. l(a).
146. Id. at art. 3.
147. Id. at art. 5.
148. Id. at art. 16.
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would allow the FSU to put the Northern Fleet beyond the reach of the
articles. 149 Absent information on the matter, legal causation would be
very difficult to prove.
Even if causation could be proved and state liability imposed by
means of customary law, the present economic state of Russia would
prevent the payment of any form of compensation to states suffering
transboundary harm. Recent studies indicate that Russia has a "virtual
economy," with its economy appearing larger than it actually is.' 5
Businesses frequently operate without paying taxes to the central gov-
ernment, which acts as a type of subsidy to unproductive sectors of the
economy, further worsening the crisis. 5' The Red Cross has gone as far
as warning that starvation is possible if the economy does not improve
in the near future. 52 In Russia's case, the impecuniosity of the polluter
may serve to make liability for its actions meaningless.
Russia's obligations of customary state responsibility come into di-
rect conflict with its existing treaty obligations. Under the Treaty Be-
tween the USA and the USSR on the Reduction and Limitation of Stra-
tegic Offensive Arms (START I), there are restrictions on the total
number of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and launchers
that Russia may posses in conjunction with other parts of its strategic
deterrent.'" Under Article 1(3) of the Treaty Between the USA and
Russia on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms (START II),"u the Russians are required, by 2003, to reduce the
number of deployed warheads on SLBMs to 1750.'5 Compliance with
the provisions of START I & II has aggravated the Russian Navy's prob-
lems with radioactive waste by requiring the decommissioning of nu-
clear powered submarines.'57 A European Commission report found
that future projections on the quantity of solid nuclear waste produced
149. The Barents Region has always held great strategic importance for the Russians
and would clearly qualify as a matter within national security. This was recognized by
the Russian minister for foreign affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, in his dealings with his
Norwegian counterpart in 1944 and it remained critical during the cold war. See
GEOFFREY TILL, NORTHERN WATERS 69 (Clive Archer & David Scrivener eds., 1986).
150. Clifford G. Gaddy & Barry W. Ickes, Russia's Virtual Economy, 77 FOREIGN AFF.
53, 54 (1998).
151. Id. at 56-57.
152. Geoffrey York, Red Cross Warns of Starvation in Russia, GLOBE AND MAIL, Oct.
1, 1998, at Al.
153. START I, supra note 29, at 591.
154. The total number of deployed ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBMs and launchers
cannot exceed 1600. See id. at art. II(1)(a).
155. START II, supra note 29, at 697.
156. The aggregate numbers for each Party shall not exceed a number between 1700
and 1750, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs or such lower number as each
Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 1750. See id. at art.
I , I(4)(a).
157. INVENTORY. supra note 9, at 98.
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would depend on the extent of Russian compliance with the START
agreements before 2003. 8
The START agreements put Russia in a legal double bind: the state
can comply with the agreements despite inadequate storage facilities for
waste and thereby violate the principle of state responsibility by creat-
ing potential transboundary pollution,'59 or it can comply with the cus-
tomary principle of international environmental law and suffer the
ramifications of violating the arms control agreements. Russia is essen-
tially caught between two different forms of state responsibility.
The effects of disarmament on the normative values of interna-
tional environmental law are largely ignored. There is little recognition
of Russia's legal double bind. Also, U.S. assistance under the Co-
operative Threat Reduction Program has been limited to providing tools
for scrapping the submarines and the program has focused more on the
safeguarding and storing of fissionable material from Russian nuclear
160
weapons.
State responsibility can not be achieved by means of treaty law, nor
is it realistic to impose state responsibility by way of customary law. As
the next section demonstrates, the weak concept of state responsibility
for transboundary harm has been further diluted by the principle of co-
operation.
IV. CO-OPERATION
Mikhail Gorbachev, in a 1987 speech in Murmansk, spoke of the
need for co-operation amongst Arctic nations and the urgent need to
draw up an "integrated comprehensive plan for protecting the natural
environment of the North." 6' This proposal echoes the customary prin-
ciple of co-operation as stated in the preamble to the Stockholm Decla-
ration, which holds that "[a] growing class of environmental problems,
because they are regional or global in extent or because they affect the
common international realm, will require extensive co-operation.. .by
international organizations in the common interest."" The concept was
further recognized in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, which affirmed
that "States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve,
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Handler, supra note 2, at 19. The program of threat reduction (Nunn-Lugar pro-
gram) has focused on the fear of proliferation of FSU warheads. See Military Implica-
tions of START I and START II: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services,
102nd Cong., Sess. 2, 89 at 90 (1992).
161. Mikhail Gorbachev, Speech in Murmansk at the Ceremonial Meeting on the Oc-
casion of the Presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star to the City of Mur-
mansk, Oct. 1, 1987 (visited Oct. 28, 1998) <http://www.sipri.se/projects
SAC/871001.html>.
162. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 126, at pmbl.
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protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem.""1
These principles are given meaning by the Arctic Environmental
Protection Strategy (AEPS) and the initiatives of the Barents Euro-
Arctic Region (BEAR). AEPS was established in 1991 by the eight Arc-
tic nations and focuses on co-operation in the areas of indigenous peo-
ple, sustainable development, environmental protection and the role of
science in the Arctic." BEAR was established in Kirkenes, Norway in
1993, and involves co-operation among Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Sweden and Russia." It has a two-tier structure involving a
regional council comprised of county and indigenous representatives
and a national council of government representatives.'6
Both of these regimes recognize the importance of nuclear contami-
nation in the Arctic and are involved in initiatives to assist with clean
up. However, AEPS and BEAR are programmatic in nature, and focus
on the co-ordination of activities as opposed to the "promulgation of
regulatory measures intended to guide the behaviour of various classes
of subject."1 7 The hope with BEAR is that this approach will eventually
lead to a dense web of co-operation in the region.
BEAR's Kirkenes Declaration specifically mentions that the par-
ticipants recognize the importance of international co-operation in the
areas of monitoring radioactivity, enhancing safety at nuclear facilities
and rehabilitating areas polluted as a result of nuclear facilities.'6 It
further emphasizes the need to create "international financial arrange-
ments," as well as encouraging "national financial contributions. 69
Such provisions seem to indicate that increased regional and Arctic co-
operation is in accord with the customary international legal principle
of co-operation.
It can be argued, however, that the initiatives, rather than giving
life to the customary principle of co-operation, simply redefine a Rus-
sian national problem as a regional problem and in doing so undermine
the principle of state responsibility. Co-operation has come to be de-
fined strictly as western funding. As the Barents Euro-Arctic Council
environmental task force indicated, "[tihe funding requirement is great
and the projects planned are under-funded."70 Much of the funding for
initial pilot projects has come through the Nordic Environment Finance
163. Rio Declaration, supra note 128, at princ. 7.
164. Davor Vidas, Polar Marine Environment in Regional Cooperation, in PROTECTING
THE POLAR MARINE ENVIRONMENT 110 (Davor Vidas ed. forthcoming).
165. Kirkenes Declaration, supra note 11, at 217.
166. Id. at 218.
167. Id. at 123.
168. Id. at 220.
169. Id.
170. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council, The Environment Task Force, Report to the
Third Ministerial Conference, St. Petersburg, Oct, 9, 1997, at 9.
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Corporation, which is supported by the governments of Nordic coun-
tries.171 Oran Young has pointed out that the major attraction of AEPS
for the Russians is the "prospect of western assistance" with environ-
mental concerns."' When viewed in this light, regional co-operation be-
comes a means to create a conduit of funds and to reduce potential li-
ability. Clearly subregional programmatic initiatives such as the Kola
Smelter Works and the Nuclear Waste Management Program have re-
sulted in the victim paying considerable amounts of the abatement
costs.'73 Some have suggested that this is the "normal procedure" for
environmental projects dealing with transboundary pollution and that
the benefit to countries such as Norway is that it puts the issue on the
agenda.7 However, heightened political awareness of a problem is a
high price to pay for the undermining of an essential principle of inter-
national environmental law.
Co-operation in dealing with the problem of naval waste has been
largely one sided. Though willing to accept aid, the Russians have been
extremely secretive about the problem. Jorgen Kosmo, the Norwegian
defense minister, has repeatedly criticized the lack of Russian co-
operation and the veil of secrecy surrounding the issue.'75 Russia has
denied Norwegian and U.S. officials information regarding the situation
in the Lista fjord and has refused to let Norwegian scientists take sam-
ples in the area.76 Naval officials have also denied access to Russian
civil inspectors, thereby violating Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration.
Principle 10 requires, at a national level, that "each individual shall
have appropriate access to information concerning the environment
that is held by public officials."
77
The need to maintain a cloak of secrecy has also resulted in the
abuse of human rights. The Russian state security apparatus arrested
a retired naval captain named Alexandr Nikitin for treason, due to his
involvement in a report detailing the environmental problems of the
Northern Fleet. 1 8 This occurred despite the fact that the report is based
on public sources. 79 The issue of the arrest was raised by Norwegian
Prime Minister Jagland at the Second Council of Europe Summit, but
this failed to produce any change in Russian policy.' It has been ar-
171. BAKLANOV ETAL., supra note 3, at 198.
172. Kirkenes Declaration, supra note 11, at 66.
173. Olav Schram Stokke, Subregional Cooperation and Protection of the Arctic Ma-
rine Environment: The Barents Sea, in PROTECTING THE POLAR MARINE ENVIRONMENT
supra note 164, at 176.
174. Id. at 152.
175. Bond, supra note 1, at 22.
176. Nilsen, supra note 38.
177. Rio Declaration, supra note 128, at princ. 10.
178. Russia's Dangerous Game, NEW SCIENTIST, Apr. 20, 1996, at 3.
179. MacKenzie, supra note 77, at 4.
180. Russian Secret and Retroactive Decrees Violate Human Rights (visited Nov. 8,
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gued that this type of action by the Russian government deters Western




Co-operation is hampered further by Russia's diffusion of responsi-
bility for the handling of nuclear waste within its own domestic gov-
ernment bureaucracy. The Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy is
gradually taking over the management of naval radioactive waste. '82
However, involved at a subordinate level are the Ministry of Defense,
the Committee of Defense Branches of Industry, the Ministry of Trans-
port and the Ministry of Construction. 183 The large number of subordi-
nate agencies does not enhance the ease at which bilateral and regional
co-operation may occur.
Russia becoming a party to the Spent Fuel Convention would not
solve the contradictory nature of the principles of responsibility and co-
operation surrounding nuclear waste. Section (vi) of the preamble reaf-
firms that the state is ultimately responsible for spent fuel, yet in sec-
tion (ix) it affirms the importance of international co-operation in the
matter."M The Convention merely serves as a legal articulation of these
two contradictory principles.
As this section has demonstrated, responsibility can ultimately be
undermined by regional and bilateral co-operation. The initiatives of
countries like Norway and organizations such as BEAR do have the
positive effect of cleaning up the problem, but they do so at the expense
of watering down state responsibility.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The problem of nuclear waste from Russian naval sources is a
pressing problem that requires immediate attention. It is not possible
for other countries to impose state responsibility on the Russians for
their nuclear waste habit through the use of treaty law. The Russians
have vigorously avoided conventions that impose any form of liability
and those conventions that do apply, such as the London Convention,
either exempt ships or are not applicable to the military.1  Any future
1998) <http://www.bellona.no/e/press/9710.htm>. Nikitin was acquitted of all charges by
a St. Petersburg City Court on December 29, 1999. However, prosecutors have appealed
the case to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the Russian Security Police
have blocked his attempts to obtain a travel passport. See Igor Kudrik, Nikitin Denied
Travelling Abroad (visited Feb. 22, 2000) <http'i/www.bellona.no/imaker?id+
15508$sub=l>.
181. Russia's Dangerous Game, supra note 178, at 3.
182. Igor Kudrik, Minatom Takes Over Naval Radwaste (visited Nov. 8, 1998)
<http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/news80930.htm>.
183. INVENTORY, supra note 9, at 10.
184. Spent Fuel Convention, supra note 98, at pmbl.
185. See generally Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention or Marine Pollution
1999
DENY. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
treaty law will have to confront the problem of imposing state responsi-
bility for military based pollution and not simply avoid the matter, as
AEPS has tended to do.1" There should be no differentiation between
civil and military sources of pollution in terms of the issue of state re-
sponsibility.
Reliance on customary principles to produce a duty of state respon-
sibility has become more difficult in light of the Sandoz and Chernobyl
precedents.187 Though much academic discussion is dedicated to this
supposedly expanding concept, the practical realities of imposing re-
sponsibility by customary means are very difficult. In fact, it can be ar-
gued that the international assistance provided to deal with the North-
ern Fleet's waste problem serves as another counter precedent to the
principle of state responsibility.
There is a definite need for regional and international cooperation
in dealing with Russia's problem, but this should not come at the cost of
ignoring the normative values of international environmental law. The
focus of organizations such as BEAR on producing cooperation rather
than a corresponding regulatory scheme has allowed Russia to continue
to produce nuclear waste and further exacerbate the problem. Future
cooperation should bear in mind the complementary principle of state
responsibility. Though it may be unrealistic to expect Russia to make a
substantial contribution to the cost of the clean up, it should at least be
required to cease its harmful behavior. A failure to do so results in
other states providing a military subsidy under the guise of environ-
mental cooperation. States must be forced to confront the environ-
mental consequences of their own militarization.
Future arms control agreements must also take into account the
principles of international environmental law. In the case of the
START agreements, no thought was given to the environmental conse-
quences of disarmament. These concerns were secondary to the issues
surrounding safeguarding and the proliferation of weapons as a result
of arms reduction. Any future treaty law should specifically recognize
the values of the Stockholm Declaration and the Rio Declaration, and
frame the agreement within the values of these two conventions. States
should not be forced to choose between the conflicting responsibilities of
arms reduction agreements and international environmental law.
by Dumping Waste and Other Matter, supra note 83.
186. Vidas, supra note 164, at 111. Vidas notes, "[sitrict separation from military se-
curity issues has pervaded this approach [AEPS], and may be seen by some as an impor-
tant precondition for success thus far. On the other hand, it might also be a valid reason
for others to fear a stalemate in particular segments of current Arctic cooperation." Id.
187. McClatchey, supra note 135, at 670.
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